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VOIR DIRE: WHAT CAN I ASK AND WHAT CAN I SAY?
MICHAEL J. AMHEN*
I. INTRODUCTION
All good trial attorneys have a deep appreciation for the importance
of voir dire in jury selection. The North Dakota Supreme Court has said,
"It is the role of the skilled attorney and the purpose of voir dire to
search for the individual, 'good' juror and eliminate the individual,
'bad' one." 1 In addition, voir dire provides the first opportunity for
attorneys and jurors to meet, and first impressions are important. 2 By
the completion of voir dire, jurors may have important impressions
concerning the competence and trustworthiness of the attorneys, and the
justice of their client's cases.3
Although voir dire offers the opportunity to make a good impres-
sion on prospective jurors, it also provides countless opportunities to
stumble. Questions can embarrass or anger jurors, 4 lead to sustained
objections, 5 or in extreme cases, can lead to a mistrial or reversal on
appeal .6
There is no shortage of advice to attorneys on how to conduct voir
dire. Continuing education programs feature such inviting titles as How
To Win In Voir Dire.7 Thick books are also now devoted to the subject. 8
There is considerable conflicting advice from fellow attorneys concern-
* Professor of Law, University of North Dakota School of Law; J.D., 1968, Vanderbilt Universi-
ty; BA., 1965, Denison University; Private practice, 1968-1970, Marion, Indiana; Deputy Prosecuting
Attorney, 1969-1970, Grant County, Indiana; Trial Attorney, 1970-1979, United States Department of
Justice; Assistant Chief, Criminal Section, Tax Division, 1979-1981, United States Department of
Justice. Professor Ahlen has served as an instructor in trial advocacy seminars for the United States
Attorney General's Advocacy Institute, The National Institute for Trial Advocacy, The National
Judicial College. the North Dakota Supreme Court, the North Dakota Association of State's Attorneys,
and the State Bar Association of North Dakota.
1. City of Mandan v. Fern, 501 N.W.2d 739, 746 (N.D. 1993).
2. John A. Call, Making the Research Work for You, TRIAL, Apr., 1996, at 20, 23.
3. See IRvING YOUNGER, JURY SELECTION 12-19 (1984) (noting that the purpose of voir dire includes
teaching the jurors about the case and letting the jury get to know your personality).
4. V. HALE STARR & MARK MCCoRmtc',JuRy SELECrIoN: AN ATTORNEY's GUIDE TO JURY LAW
AND METHODS § 11.25 (2d ed. 1993).
5. See State v. Huber, 361 N.W.2d 236,237-39 (N.D.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1106 (1985).
6. See State v. Mehralian, 301 N.W.2d 409,418-19 (N.D. 1981) (reversing trial court and finding
that defendant was denied a fair trial).
7. See GERRY S PENCE, GERRY S PENCE IN T RiAL: HOW T O WIN IN Vom D mE (1995) (a videotape
featuring lectures and film from an actual murder trial in an Oregon state court).
8. See STARR & MCCORMICK, supra note 4; WARD WAGNER, JR., ART OF ADVOCACY-JURY
SELCTION (1995).
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ing what to ask during jury selection, and almost every litigator can
provide an example to disprove any other attorney's approach. 9
This viewpoint considers the legal limits on what may be asked of
jurors during voir dire in North Dakota. Attorneys have also been using
voir dire to provide information to jurors, 10 and consideration is given to
the limits applicable to such information sharing. While trial judges have
considerable discretion in what to allow during voir dire, there are some
definite boundaries.II There are also some areas, that while not forbid-
den, are dangerous territory because the court can suddenly exercise
discretion and cut off inquiry in a manner that makes the attorney look
bad.12 Finally, there are some areas which should be the subject of
inquiry, and failure to do so can have significant adverse consequen-
ces.13
North Dakota Supreme Court decisions provide substantial guid-
ance to attorneys on how to avoid stumbling during jury selection.
Similarly, North Dakota trial judges have been innovative in finding
practical solutions to problems in voir dire. 14 This viewpoint is intended
to piece together the law and practice of voir dire in North Dakota, and
to offer suggestions on avoiding the problems which have most often
arisen while questioning jurors.
II. THE BASIC NORTH DAKOTA LAWS OF VOIR DIRE
A. DISTINCTION BETWEEN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL VoIR DIRE
In North Dakota state courts, attorneys have the right to conduct
voir dire of prospective jurors in both civil 15 and criminal16 jury trials.
Criminal jury selection is governed primarily by Rule 24 of the North
Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure and by Chapter 29-17 of the North
Dakota Century Code. Civil jury selection is governed primarily by Rule
47 of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure and by Chapter 28-14
of the North Dakota Century Code.
The common law concerning voir dire in criminal cases frequently
involves federal constitutional issues. Criminal defendants have a right
9. THoMAs A. MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES § 2.1 (4th ed. 1996).
10. See YoUNGER, supra note 3, at 12-14.
11. See infra part III (discussing prohibited areas of voir dire).
12. See infra part IV (discussing discretionary areas in voir dire).
13. See infra part VI (discussing potential issues in voir dire).
14. A substantial amount of voir dire practice has never been commented upon in North Dakota
appellate decisions. The author relies on personal observation of voir dire as conducted by judges in
voir dire both in real trials and mock trials at the North Dakota School of Law in commenting on North
Dakota practice.
15. N.D. R. Civ. P. 47(a).
16. N.D. R. Cium. P. 24(a).
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to trial by an impartial jury "under the Sixth Amendment of the federal
constitution, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." 17 The North Dakota Supreme Court has also relied on the Equal
Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution to forbid gender-based exercise of peremptory challenges
in a criminal case, 18 and noted that questions asked during voir dire,
together with responses, may be significant in determining whether
challenges were gender-based.19
State civil cases involving voir dire issues have been decided by the
North Dakota Supreme Court under state rules and statutes rather than
federal or state constitutional provisions. The Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution applies only to criminal cases. 20 Although the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment might apply to
jury selection in civil actions in state court,21 such application has not yet
been made.
Courts often use the same principles of voir dire in both civil and
criminal cases, 22 but such similarity should not be assumed. 23 Even
when a common principle is embraced by civil and criminal courts, the
fact that the criminal defendant's rights spring from the Sixth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution, while the civil parties do not,
provides potential for greater protection to be afforded in the criminal
case.
B. SCOPE OF VoIR DIRE IN CIVIL CASES
The scope of voir dire in civil cases is quite broad. Prior to adop-
tion of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, 24 the North Dakota
Supreme Court discussed the scope of voir dire in a way which, with one
exception, accurately describes the practice of civil voir dire today:
17. State v. Smaage, 547 N.W.2d 916,919 (N.D. 1996).
18. City of Mandan v. Fern, 501 N.W.2d 739,747 (N.D. 1993).
19. Id. at 748-49 (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-97 (1980)).
20. U.S. CONST. amend VI. The Sixth Amendment states that: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed ..... Id.
21. There is potential for state courts to apply the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to jury selection in civil cases which excludes jurors on the basis of race. See Edmonson
v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 631 (1991) (noting that the Batson approach is applicable to
civil cases).
22. Compare State v. Purdy, 491 N.W.2d 402, 407 (N.D.1992) with Loveland v. Nieters, 54
N.W.2d 533, 536-37 (N.D. 1952) (both embracing the idea that the purpose of voir dire is to select a
fair and impartial jury).
23. See Cassaday v. Souris River Tel. Coop., 520 N.W.2d 803, 806 (N.D. 1995) (refusing to
apply "an unexplained blanket disqualification" from a past criminal case to a civil case).
24. The North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure became effective on July 1, 1957. N.D. R. CIv.
P. 86 (1996-1997) (providing effective date of rules).
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"Examination into the qualifications, attitudes, and
inclinations of jurors, before they are impaneled and sworn to
try a case, is necessarily incident to the practice of challenging.
Only such an examination can provide the information or
suspicion to constitute a basis for the intelligent and practical
exercise of challenges to accomplish the end desired-exclu-
sion from the jury of those who would act from prejudice or
interest or without qualification to judge soundly.
An examination of a prospective juror on his voir dire is
proper so long as it is conducted strictly within the right to
discover the state of mind of the juror with respect to the matter
in hand or any collateral matter reasonably liable to unduly
influence him, and questions which go primarily to the ascer-
tainment of any probable bias or ground of incompetency, as a
basis of a challenge for cause, or possibly, of a peremptory
challenge, are permissible. However, while the scope of the
inquiry will not be confined strictly to the subjects which
constitute grounds for the sustaining of a challenge for cause,
if it extends beyond such subjects it must be conducted in
good faith with the object of obtaining a fair and impartial
jury, and must not go so far beyond the parties and the issues
directly involved that it is likely to create a bias, a prejudice, or
an unfair attitude toward any litigant. Nevertheless, the adverse
litigants should be given the right to inquire freely about the
interest, direct or indirect, of the proposed juror, that may
affect his final decision. The scope of inquiry is best governed
by a wise and liberal discretion of the court, but the court
should not at any time ask, or permit counsel to ask, a prospec-
tive juror any question the answer to which would tend to
incriminate or disgrace him." 25
The exception to modern practice involves prohibition of questions,
"the answer to which would tend to incriminate or disgrace him." 26
Today jurors are routinely asked about prior experiences with courts.
Such broad inquiries result in disclosure of arrests for driving under the
influence and a number of other activities which might "disgrace" them
in the minds of some.
A broad scope of voir dire in civil cases is necessary because parties
and prospective jurors often have some relationship before trial, especial-
25. Loveland v. Nieters, 54 N.W.2d 533, 536-37 (N.D. 1952) (citations omitted) (quoting 31 AM.
JUt. Jury §§ 104, 107 (1940)).
26. Id. at 537 (quoting 31 AM. JuR. Jury § 107 (1940)).
634 [VOL. 72:631
1996] VoIR DnI 635
ly in sparsely populated areas, and the venire often has some knowledge
of the subject matter of the trial.27 The North Dakota Supreme Court
has refused to adopt automatic or blanket disqualifications of potential
jurors simply because of membership in cooperatives which are parties
to a lawsuit 28 or remote business relationships.29 "Instead, [the trial
court must] adhere to a challenge-for-cause basis for dismissal of
potential jurors," 30 with individualized inquiry as to the nature of the
alleged excluding interest. Where potential prejudice exists, the North
Dakota Supreme Court has urged trial courts to allow both parties
"liberal voir dire examination," 31 or "great latitude" in voir dire in
order to determine the existence of prejudice or bias.32
C. SCOPE OF VoIR DIRE IN CRIMINAL CASES
The primary purpose of voir dire in criminal cases is to permit
examination "to determine whether any [prospective] juror is biased for
or against any party." 33
Under section 29-17-35 of the N.D.C.C., a party may chal-
lenge a juror for cause based on actual bias or implied bias.
Actual bias is "[t]he existence of a state of mind on the part of
the juror ...that he cannot try the issue impartially without
prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging."
Implied bias exists in certain legally specified circumstances,
which are listed in section 29-17-36, N.D.C.C.34
27. See Slaubaugh v. Slaubaugh, 499 N.W.2d 99, 103-07 (N.D. 1993) (noting use of voir dire in
deciding on change of venue where prospective juror knew the litigants or witnesses).
28. Larson v. Williams Elec. Co-op., 534 N.W.2d 1, 3-4 (N.D. 1995); Cassady v. Souris River
Tel. Coop., 520 N.W.2d 803,806 (N.D. 1994).
29. See Larson, 534 N.W.2d at 3-4 (citing cases); Jerry Harmon Motors, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co., 440 N.W.2d 704, 709 (N.D. 1989) (refusing "to require automatic disqualification of
[bank] depositors from serving on a jury in an action involving that bank"); Basin Elec. Power Coop. v.
Miller, 310 N.W.2d 715, 718-19 (N.D. 1981) (finding that an employee of one of the parties need not
be "disqualified as a matter of law, particularly in the absence of a challenge for cause to that
particular prospective juror"); Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n v. Nelson, 223 N.W.2d 494 (N.D.
1974) (holding that "[a] blanket disqualification for GTA members would not appear advisable"
where members in question did not do business with particular GTA elevator in question and where
most prospective jurors have had some business with "GTA-owned or associated" facilities).
30. Larson, 534 N.W.2d at 4.
31. Marshall v. City of Beach, 294 N.W.2d 623, 626, 628 (N.D. 1980) (noting Plaintiff's argu-
ment that, as taxpayers, prospective jurors "would have an interest of a financial nature in the
outcome of the case").
32. Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. Boschker, 289 N.W.2d 553, 559 (N.D. 1980) (noting that some
prospective jurors may have had access to or read certain articles published in cooperative's
magazine).
33. N.D. R. Cium. P. 24 explanatory note.
34. State v. Smaage, 547 N.W.2d 916,919 (N.D. 1996) (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
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Voir dire also provides information which may assist attorneys in
the exercise of peremptory challenges,35 as well as provide information
to assist the attorneys and court to determine whether a change in venue
should be granted. 36 "While there are some cases in which prejudice to
the defendant is so clear that a change of venue should be ordered
promptly, generally voir dire examination is an appropriate occasion to
determine whether it is possible to select a fair and impartial jury." 3
7
Several factors lead to the conclusion that the scope of voir dire
should be broad in criminal cases. Jurors may be reluctant to admit
prejudice 38 or may not even be aware that they are prejudiced.39 Deter-
mining whether a juror has a bias for or against a party may require
extensive questioning as to juror background and life experiences, 40 and
should be at least as broad as the broad inquiry allowed in civil cases,
relying to a great extent on the discretion of the trial judge.41
North Dakota's sparse population often results in prospective jurors
with knowledge of the parties, the event which is at the heart of the
dispute, and the attorneys.42 As the North Dakota Supreme Court has
noted: "Although a defendant is entitled to a panel of impartial jurors,
qualified jurors need not be totally ignorant of the facts and issues
involved in a case. A distinction must be made between mere familiarity
with the defendant or his past and an actual predisposition against him..
: ."43 To make such a distinction, attorneys often need to question
jurors in great detail about the impact of their familiarity with the case
and personalities involved.
The need for broad voir dire is also great because of the reluctance
of courts to imply bias simply because of a prospective juror's occupa-
tion. For example, implied bias was not assumed of a state Highway
Patrolman who was a prospective juror in a D.U.I. case brought by a
city, 44 nor against a part-time police officer in a murder trial.45 The
35. Cf. City of Mandan v. Fern, 501 N.W.2d 739, 748-49 (N.D. 1993) (noting that certain voir
dire questioning may indicate whether peremptory challenges are being used for discriminatory
purpose).
36. State v. Breding, 526 N.W.2d 465,468 (N.D. 1995).
37. Id.
38. Amy Singer, Selecting Jurors: What to Do About Bias, TRIAL, Apr. 1996, at 29, 30.
39. STARR & McCotacc, supra note 4, § 9.4.
40. MAuET, supra note 9, at 25-26.
41. See Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415,422 (1991) (citing Connors v. United States, 158 U.S.
408,413 (1895) for the proposition that in criminal or civil cases, the breadth of voir dire is left to the
court's discretion).
42. See e.g., State v. Smaage, 547 N.W.2d 916, 918-20 (N.D. 1996) (noting that prospective
jurors were aware of Defendant and the accident and that one juror had contacts with the prosecutor).
43. Id. at 919 (quoting State v. McLain, 301 N.W.2d 616, 623 (N.D. 1981)).
44. City of Bismarck v. Holden, 522 N.W.2d 471,473-74 (N.D. 1994).
45. State v. Ternes, 259 N.W.2d 296,298 (N.D. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 944 (1978).
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existence of actual bias must be determined from meaningful voir dire
examination of the prospective juror.46
An attorney requesting a change of venue has "the burden of
demonstrating a reasonable likelihood of prejudice so pervasive that a
fair and impartial jury could not be found."47 Reversal on appeal will
only take place "when the prejudice to the defendant is so palpable and
clear from the record that it was unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious
for the court to conclude that a fair and impartial jury could be impan-
eled." 4 8 Such heavy burdens necessitate wide latitude in voir dire.
III. PROHIBITED AREAS OF VOIR DIRE
A. PREJUDICIAL QUESTIONS
Highly inflammatory and irrelevant questions during voir dire in a
criminal case can lead to reversible error, as in the case of references to
an Iranian defendant's religious beliefs and nationality at the time of the
hostage crisis at the American embassy in Iran. 49 In determining if
reversible error has occurred, the trial court may consider other prejudi-
cial conduct during the trial, together with the conduct in voir dire.50
There is no reported North Dakota civil case in which a reversal
resulted due to prejudicial questions or statements made during voir dire.
Such conduct at the very beginning of a trial would normally result in a
mistrial.51 If a motion for a mistrial is denied, the potential for reversal is
great if it appears that an attorney attempted "to create a bias, a preju-
dice or unfair attitude toward any litigant"5 2 in voir dire. North Dako-
ta's stringent rules against the mention of insurance coverage should
serve as a warning against improperly advising the prospective jurors in
voir dire of any party's insurance coverage. 53
B. AMOUNT OF DAMAGES
Questions concerning the amount of damages which potential jurors
would be willing to return are not appropriate because:
46. Id.
47. State v. Austin, 520 N.W.2d 564,566 (N.D. 1994).
48. Id. at 568.
49. State v. Mehralian, 301 N.W.2d 409,418-19 (N.D. 1981) (holding that prejudicial remarks
during voir dire, highly prejudicial questions during the case-in-chief, and improper remarks in closing
argument, all combined to render the trial unfair).
50. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing when a case may be reversed for pre-
judicial conduct).
51. See STmu & McCou.micK, supra note 4, § 9.1.6 (discussing avoiding mistrials).
52. Loveland v. Nieters, 54 N.W.2d 533, 537 (N.D. 1952).
53. See Smith v. Anderson, 451 N.W.2d 108, 110-11 (N.D. 1990) (discussing related cases).
1996] 637
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they may tend to influence the jury as to the size of the verdict,
and may lead to the impaneling of a jury which is predisposed
to finding a higher verdict by its tacit promise to return a
verdict for the amount specified in the question during the voir
dire examination.54
It was not error, for an attorney to question prospective jurors if they
would be reluctant to return a large monetary award, when a specific
figure was not mentioned. 55
C. POST-VERDICT DISPOSITION
The defendant in a criminal trial is not entitled to inquire if prospect-
ive jurors know that in the event that the jury finds the defendant not
guilty by reason of lack of criminal responsibility, that the state's
attorney is required to file a petition for involuntary treatment of the
defendant. 56 "The purpose of the jury is to find the facts and determine
a defendant's guilt or innocence. The consequences of a verdict of not
guilty by reason of a lack of criminal responsibility have no bearing on
any issue which the jury must decide." 57
IV. DISCRETIONARY AREAS IN VOIR DIRE
A. THE DANGER OF DISCRETIONARY SUBJECTS OF VoIR DIRE
The subject matter of some questions and statements is not prohibit-
ed in voir dire, but can be limited by the judge's exercise of discretion.
Several North Dakota judges will halt voir dire without an objection if
they believe an attorney has gone too far. When a judge repeatedly halts
an attorney's voir dire, and advises the jury to disregard a line of ques-
tioning, the attorney may appear incompetent to potential jurors. If a
judge becomes obviously irritated by an attorney who continually asks
questions which are objectionable, the jury might draw an inference that
the attorney is intentionally violating the rules.
B. TELLING THE JURY ABOUT THE CASE
Attorneys are often allowed to make a few comments to the jury
before starting the questioning. The commentary normally provides
some background information regarding the questions which follow.
54. Trautman v. New Rockford-Fessenden Co-op Transp. Ass'n, 181 N.W.2d 754, 759 (N.D.
1970).
55. Dehn v. Otter Tail Power Co., 251 N.W.2d 404,415 (N.D. 1977).
56. State v. Huber, 361 N.W.2d 236,237-38 (N.D.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1106 (1985).
57. Id. at 238.
[VOL. 72:631638
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Attorneys sometimes push the limits of such commentary in an effort to
indoctrinate or win over jurors. 58 A North Dakota judge has never been
reversed for terminating an attorney's salesmanship in voir dire.
Statements may be made to jurors in addition to those made as
introductory comments. Almost any statement can be phrased as a
question. 59 For example an attorney who wants the jury to know that his
client is generous in contribution of time to local charities might ask,
"Are any of you associated with the Red Cross, the American Lung
Association or the United Fund, or have you come into contact with my
client or his family in their volunteer work for these organizations?"
The questioner is not really interested in the answer to the question, 60 but
is using the question as a tool to sell the case.
Judges will often cut off the attorney if it appears that the questions
or statements are a sales device rather than an attempt to find a fair and
impartial jury. There is simply no North Dakota authority which sup-
ports the use of voir dire to sell a case.
Statements which are not questions are sometimes allowed during
voir dire if necessary to explain the background for questions. For
example, a prosecutor's comment during voir dire, that "someone will
not get up and say I did it," was seen in the context of questions asked
as only an assurance that the trial would not proceed in the manner of a
television drama. 6 1 The comments would, however, have created a
significant problem if they could have been reasonably interpreted as a
comment on the defendant's failure to testify. 62
C. DiscusSIONS OF LAW
Some judges allow attorneys to discuss the law of the case in voir
dire, particularly in criminal cases in which the entire defense rests upon
burden of proof or presumption of innocence. Nationally, there is a
trend toward restricting attorneys' discussion of law.63
A prosecuting attorney's assertive statements during voir dire
regarding law governing the case are risky. A prosecutor's statement
that "the Defendant never has to take the stand, and I'm not saying that
he should or should not take the stand," 64 was held not to result in
reversible error. 65 However, the court stated that such remarks "are not
58. See STARR & MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 11.6.7 (discussing judges' concerns).
59. See YOUNGER, supra note 3, at 13-14.
60. Id.
61. State v. Skjonsby, 319 N.W.2d 764, 787 (N.D. 1982).
62. Id.
63. MAuEr, supra note 9, at 17.
64. State v. Flohr, 310 N.W.2d 735,736 (N.D. 1981).
65. Id. at 737.
1996] 639
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to be praised" 66 and noted the judge's prompt corrective instruction to
the jury to disregard the assertion. 67
If the attorney misstates the law, or states it in a confusing manner, it
may be impossible for the judge to straighten out through curative
instructions. In one instance, the North Dakota Supreme Court found
that the attorney's discussion of the law in voir dire invited error with
regard to the court's subsequent instructions. 68 A growing number of
North Dakota courts have avoided or minimized the problem of attor-
neys seeking to discuss the law of a case by instructing the jury as to key
provisions of law before voir dire.69
D. REPETITIVE QUESTIONS
The court may prevent "the propounding of . repetitious ques-
tions." 70 This restriction may pose a problem for attorneys who ques-
tion last in multi-party cases since preceding attorneys may already have
covered most relevant topics. If the attorney conducts voir dire, objec-
tions may be sustained, thus risking jurors will think the attorney incom-
petent. To fail to question denies the attorney the opportunity to have
an equal opportunity to gauge the jurors reactions to the attorney, as well
as to risk that the jurors will perceive that he or she is disinterested.71
E. VEXATIOUS QUESTIONS
A trial court may also prevent vexatious questions. 72 Although the
North Dakota Supreme Court has never defined vexatious as it relates to
questions during jury selection, in another context it has adopted a
dictionary definition of vexatious as meaning "lacking justification and
intend[ing] to harass." 73 Similarly, confusing questions are sometimes
disallowed whether or not they are technically vexatious. The logic
behind such rulings is so obvious, and the cure so readily available that
such rulings are not likely candidates for appeal.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 736.
68. State v. Austin, 520 N.W.2d 564, 569-70 (N.D. 1994).
69. See Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. Boschker, 289 N.W.2d 559-60 (N.D. 1980) (affirming denial
of motion for change of venue on condition that "prior to voir dire examination, the trial court give
preliminary instructions to the jury panel on the law"). The trend may not be reflected in appellate
decisions because it prevents error before it occurs.
70. State v. Purdy, 491 N.W.2d 402,407 (N.D. 1992).
71. See STARR & MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 11.2.2 (discussing the depth of questioning).
72. Purdy, 491 N.W.2d at 407.
73. Bloom v. Northern Pac. R.R. Beneficial Ass'n, 193 N.W.2d 244, 253 (N.D. 1971) (quoting
WEBsTER's THID NEW INTERNATIONAL DICIONARY 2548 (1961), in case involving a defendant-insur-




Parties frequently admit weaknesses in their own cases during voir
dire.
In many cases, it is effective trial strategy to precondition jurors
to any potentially negative aspects of a defendant's case at the
earliest and least prejudicial time of a trial-and during the voir
dire examination of the jury is an ideal time to do so because it
permits a party to remove jurors who are found to be preju-
diced by such information in the event it should happen to be
revealed in the course of a trial.74
However, a problem occurs when the attorney not only volunteers a
weakness, but then begins to comment on the evidence which will be
presented to overcome the weakness. It would be proper and perhaps
good strategy for an attorney to volunteer during voir dire that his client
had a prior conviction and ask if jurors could still be fair and impartial.75
The problem occurs when the attorney tries to use voir dire to inform the
jury that the client has reformed since the conviction, or offers similar
mitigating information. Such mitigating information may not even be
admissible at trial, let alone in voir dire, and there have been no success-
ful appeals of limiting this tactic.
V. POTENTIAL ISSUES IN VOIR DIRE
A. JUROR PRIVACY
North Dakota appellate decisions have not yet directly addressed the
issue of juror privacy interests during voir dire. The issue is becoming
more important in other jurisdictions. A full review of privacy issues in
other jurisdictions is beyond the scope of this viewpoint, but there are a
number of developments to follow because of their potential impact
here.
Some federal courts have begun to protect privacy interests of
jurors. Courts have allowed jury selection to be conducted with identity
of jurors kept from the parties when there was a credible threat to jury
74. State v. LaFromboise, 246 N.W.2d 616, 620 (N.D. 1976) (holding that disclosure of the
defendant's prior criminal record during voir dire did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel).
75. Id.
1996]
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safety.76 In other instances, juror identity has been kept from the media
out of concern for jurors' privacy interests .77
A federal court in a criminal drug prosecution has denied distribu-
tion of the defense questionnaire which called for, among other things,
information about the prospective jurors' thoughts about illegal and
legal immigrants, jurors' memberships in racially exclusive clubs, and
instances in which jurors referred to minorities in derogatory language.
7a
The court found that many of the matters listed on the questionnaire
were "unduly invasive and violat[ed] the right to privacy of prospective
jurors."79 The court did not specify which portions of the questionnaire
were disallowed because of invasion of privacy, and which were merely
duplicative of other questions which the court proposed to ask.
80
In another case, a federal magistrate judge set aside a state juror's
imprisonment for contempt for refusing to answer a questionnaire
concerning her family income, her religious preference, her political
views, the medications which she was taking, and a number of questions
concerning organizations to which she belonged and the media which
she relied upon.81 The court noted that there had been a failure of the
trial court to determine the relevance of the questions and to weigh the
competing interests of the juror's constitutional right to privacy, the
defendant's right to an impartial jury, and the public's right of access to
jury information.8 2 The opinion faults the trial court for failing to
advise the juror of the option of discussing private matters in camera.8 3
Even if the juror should be required to answer, she should have the least
intrusive means to provide private information.84
Good litigators tend to be mindful of jury privacy even without
court supervision. Asking questions which jurors regard as an unwarrant-
ed invasion of privacy is likely to embarrass and anger jurors.S5 North
Dakota attorneys and judges have developed a number of procedures to
reduce the impact of voir dire on privacy concerns.86
76. United States v. Ross, 33.F.3d 1507, 1519-20 (1 th Cir. 1994) (citing similar cases from other
jurisdictions), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2558 (1995); Nancy J. King, Nameless Justice: The Case for the
Routine Use of Anonymous Juries in Criminal Trials, 49 VAND. L. REv. 123, 130 (1996).
77. King, supra note 76, at 130-31.
78. United States v. Padilla-Valenzuela, 896 F. Supp. 968,970-73 (D. Ariz. 1995).
79. Id. at 972.
80. Id.
81. Brandborg v. Lucas, 891 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Tex. 1995).
82. Id. at 361.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See STARR & MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 11.2.1-.8.
86. See infra part VIE-F.
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B. QUESTIONING ABOUT MEDIA TORT REFORM CAMPAIGNS
In Tighe v. Crosthwait,87 a medical malpractice action, the Mississip-
pi Supreme Court found that the trial court erred in precluding questions
regarding the possible prejudicial effect of public campaigns concerning
the so-called "medical malpractice crisis" and "insurance crisis."88
The court found that the error was harmless because the media campaign
was primarily directed at the issue of excessive damages rather than the
issue of liability, and since the jury found no liability, the publicity
regarding the amount of damages was harmless.89 The court also noted
that some of the other questions during voir dire covered many of the
same areas covered by the excluded questions.90
Tighe is significant because the plaintiff established how a media
and letter writing campaign had been conducted by the insurance
industry, together with a deposition from another case in which an
insurance company executive had admitted to a letter writing campaign
aimed at influencing readers in the event that they should ever be called
for jury duty. 91 It also contains citations to the growing number of states
which have ruled to some degree that voir dire questions should be
allowed with regard to media campaigns for tort reform.92
It would appear that the scope of voir dire in North Dakota is broad
enough to allow questions concerning prospective jurors' exposure to
public relations efforts of business and insurance companies to limit
damages and/or reduce plaintiffs' verdicts.93 The questions should be
posed in such a way that jurors are not advised of the insurance coverage
of the parties. 94
C. CONCERNS OVER "RIGGED" JURIES
Some courts have expressed concern over the growing use of jury
consultants and computers to aid in the selection of jurors. The concern
is that such experts are not really attempting to secure a fair and impar-
tial jury, but rather to conduct voir dire in such a way as to "mold the
87. 665 So. 2d 1337 (Miss. 1995).
88. Tighe v. Crosthwait, 665 So. 2d 1337, 1338, 1341 (Miss. 1995).
89. Id. at 1341.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1339.
92. Id. at 1340-41. See also Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96, 104 (Utah 1993) (holding that it was
error for trial court to not inquire about "exposure to tort-reform").
93. See Loveland v. Nieters, 54 N.W.2d 533, 536-37 (N.D. 1952) (discussing scope of voir dire).
94. See Smith v. Anderson, 451 N.W.2d 108, 110-11 (N.D. 1990) (discussing effect of statement
concerning insurance).
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jury" to be more receptive to the employer's case. 95 The tone of the
comments comes close to accusing consultants of rigging juries.
The sudden concern with jury consultants is somewhat puzzling.
Some attorneys have been trying to "mold" juries during voir.dire even
without the help of jury consultants, 96 and have been doing so for a long
time. The North Dakota Supreme Court recognized the importance of a
broad scope of voir dire long before jury consultants became popular,
97
and the need for such inquiry is at least as great now as it was then.
Judges, using their discretion, have prevented improper voir dire practic-
es when attorneys have attempted to improperly "mold" favorable
juries during voir dire, and appear just as capable with jury consultants.
Jury consultants have provided a valuable service to the justice
system. They have caused attorneys to focus on the wide range of
activities of prospective jurors to test for bias rather than to rely on
stereotypes previously used.98 They have also provided studies to test
how well their theories of jury selection work. 99 The growth or survival
of the consultants is likely to depend on how well they assist attorneys in
finding individual "good" jurors and eliminating "bad" ones as the
supreme court advised skilled attorneys to do.100
Over the past two years, many students of the University of North
Dakota School of Law have had the opportunity to work with students of
U.N.D.'s Department of Psychology under the direction of Douglas
Peters, Ph.D. Peters and the psychology students have been extremely
helpful in teaching the law students how to ask questions in voir dire
which elicit useful information about jurors' prejudices. They have also
proved to be remarkably accurate in analyzing juror responses, and in
picking up both verbal and nonverbal clues provided by jurors. Peters
and the psychology students have had great success in helping the future
attorneys spot people who were to be the leaders during jury delibera-
tion.
95. See United States v. Padilla-Valenzuela, 896 F. Supp 968, 971-72 (D. Ariz. 1995) (citing
Schlinsky v. United States, 379 F.2d 735, 738 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 920 (1967) and
Brandborg v. Lucas, 891 F. Supp 352, 356 (E.D. Tex. 1995)).
96. See Spence, supra note 7 (use of jury consultants is discouraged).
97. See Loveland, 54 N.W.2d at 536-37 (discussing scope of voir dire).
98. MAttEr, supra note 9, at 24-26 (discussing approaches to questioning prospective jurors).
99. Id.
100. City of Mandan v. Fern. 501 N.W.2d 739,746 (N.D. 1993).
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VI. AVOIDING TRAPS IN VOIR DIRE
A. HAVE A RECORD OF VOIR DIRE MADE
Absent a request that the court reporter transcribe voir dire, or an
objection to the lack of transcription, failure of the court reporter to
transcribe voir dire is not per se reversible error. 101 The appellate court
is seriously limited in review of errors relating to voir dire without a
transcript.10 2
B. ESTABLISH ON THE RECORD THE GROUNDS FOR BOTH CHALLENGES
FOR CAUSE AND PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
Once a request has been made to have voir dire recorded, it is
essential that attorneys ask sufficient questions to detail the facts evidenc-
ing bias or prejudice on the part of a prospective juror before challeng-
ing for cause. There are numerous examples from both criminal103 and
civi1l04 cases where an appeal from the trial court's denial of a challenge
for cause was rejected because the record failed to disclose sufficient
evidence of bias or prejudice. Attorneys cannot expect either a trial
court or appellate court to find bias simply because a prospective juror
had some knowledge of the case or the parties,105 or because of a minor
business relationship.106
Making a record with regard to peremptory challenges is increas-
ingly important in view of prohibitions against gender-based or race-
based peremptory challenges. The questions and answers of prospective
jurors during voir dire, together with each juror's demeanor may play an
important role in determining whether the peremptory challenges were
made on an impermissible basis.107
101. State v. Rougemont, 340 N.W.2d 47, 51 (N.D. 1983).
102. See State v. Smaage, 547 N.W.2d 916, 919 n.1 (N.D. 1996); Larson v. Williams Elec.
Co-op., 534 N.W.2d 1, 3 n.2 (N.D. 1995); State v. Gross, 351 N.W.2d 428,432-33 (N.D. 1984).
103. See Smaage, 547 N.W.2d at 919; State v. McLain, 301 N.W.2d 616, 622-23 (N.D. 1981).
104. See Larson, 534 N.W.2d at 4; Cassady v. Souris River Tel. Coop., 520 N.W.2d 803. 806-07.
(N.D. 1994).
105. See supra notes 27, 42-43 and accompanying text (discussing same).
106. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text (discussing same).
107. City of Mandan v. Fern, 501 N.W.2d 739, 749 (N.D. 1993).
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C. MAKE A RECORD OF VOIR DIRE SuFFICIENT TO PROTECT AGAINST
WRONG ANSWERS
Jurors may give an incorrect answer to questions during voir dire.
To obtain a new trial with regard to such a mistake, a party must demon-
strate that the incorrect answer "might affect a juror's impartiality."' 08
When a juror is alleged to have withheld information about being in
a similar accident, despite a specific question on that point, the party
making a motion for a new trial must establish that at the time of voir
dire, the questioning attorney was without information that the juror was
involved in the accident and also that the attorney "could not have
acquired such information through diligent effort on his part."109 The
North Dakota Supreme Court also indicated that even if the plaintiff
fulfilled these conditions, it would also be necessary to establish that but
for the omission, "a different verdict would have been rendered or a new
trial will probably result in a changed verdict."' l0
It will obviously be difficult to establish reversible error in any case,
but impossible without a record sufficient to illustrate that the question
and answer were important. If dishonesty is alleged with respect to the
response, the record must be sufficiently detailed to establish that there
has been an intentional misstatement rather than an innocent mistake or
misunderstanding.
D. PROTECT AGAINST UNREASONABLE TIME RESTRICTIONS
The trial court may impose reasonable time limits on voir dire.1ll
However, arbitrary and unreasonable time limits may result in reversible
error if a party demonstrates that the trial court precluded the asking of
relevant and proper questions to prospective jurors.ll 2 Thus, the record
should reflect the subjects which the attorney was unable to inquire
about due to the time limit. 113
The problem of unreasonable time limits can be avoided through
the use of flexible time guidelines,114 or agreements between the parties
as to time limits.
108. Sathren v. Behm Propane, Inc., 444 N.W.2d 696, 698 (N.D. 1989) (noting that juror re-
sponded that he had no business relationship with a party, when he had conducted a single transaction
with a party).
109. Leake v. Hagert, 175 N.W.2d 675,691 (N.D. 1970).
110. Id. (noting however, that the court did not have to reach this issue because the complaining
party had not fulfilled other requirements for a new trial).
111. State v. Purdy, 491 N.W.2d 402, 407 (N D. 1992).
112. Id. at 407-08.
113. Id. at 408 (noting that "defendants did not submit additional questions to the trial court that




E. PROVIDE CONFIDENTIALITY FOR JUROR RESPONSES TO SENSITIVE
QUESTIONS
1. Use of Jury Questionnaires
Questionnaires are used in some North Dakota courts in both
criminal and civil trials. 115 Rule 17.1 (C)(1) of the North Dakota Rules
of Criminal Procedure specifically points out that questionnaires are one
item which can be considered at pretrial conferences. The use of written
jury questionnaires has the potential to save courts time116 and protect
juror privacy interests.1 17 Most important of all, there is substantial
research which indicates that questionnaires result in more truthful
answers from prospective jurors.' 18
Some voir dire questions are very difficult to ask and to answer, yet
they should be asked. A prospective juror's experience with sexual
misconduct by others may well result in important emotional reactions
should he or she be called to sit in judgment of a gross sexual imposition
case or one involving sexual harassment. A venire person's experiences
with drug or alcohol addiction may result in prejudice in considering
driving under the influence or dram shop cases.
In mock trials held at the law school, we have seen prospective
jurors with important information concerning possible prejudice and
bias, sit silently while attorneys ask them personal questions which would
cause some embarrassment if answered in public. No doubt in the minds
of some mock trial jurors, and real prospective jurors, it is better to
remain silent than to embarrass themselves or their friends or family
members who have some personal secret. Consider the following quest-
ion allegedly asked by an attorney in a recent gross sexual imposition
trial: "Does anyone here believe that having sexual relationships with a
child should be legal or there shouldn't be laws against it . . . "119
Assuming that any juror believes such acts should be legal, does anyone
actually believe that they would make such a statement in open court in
North Dakota?
It is impossible to predict in advance which questions might require
an embarrassing answer from a prospective juror. Even the simple
115. See State v. Smaage, 547 N.W.2d 916,919 (N.D. 1996) (noting that defendant used ques-
tionnaire which asked jurors of their familiarity with defendant's drinking habits to support his motion);
Copenhaver v. Geier, 508 N.W.2d 877, 877 (N.D. 1993) (noting use of questionnaire).
116. STARR & McCoRMICK, supra note 4, § 2.8.
117. See supra part V.A (discussing juror privacy).
118. MAuET, supra note 9, at 16-17.
119. State v. Gonderman, 531 N.W.2d 11, 15 (1995).
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question of where someone is employed might call for disclosure of loss
of employment or bankruptcy, something that many people would find
embarrassing.
Questionnaires may be abused. A series of questions may be
constructed in such a way as to suggest information to prospective jurors
in an attempt to influence their opinions. Where the purpose of a
questionnaire is primarily to serve as a sales device, rather than to find a
fair and impartial jury, the trial court may limit the questionnaire just as
oral voir dire may be limited.120
2. Individual Questioning of Jurors
Trial courts may allow the "singular examination of prospective
jurors in chambers" in both civil'121 and criminal cases. 12 2 A judge has
also held such individual question in the courtroom with only a single
juror present at a time during voir dire. 123 Another judge allowed jurors
to be questioned in small groups.124 Such individualized questioning
may make jurors more willing to admit to embarrassing facts. If a juror
responds with an answer which may unfairly prejudice one of the parties,
the fact that the answer is made out of the presence of other prospective
jurors guards against the contamination of the whole panel by such a
prejudicial remark.
3. Judge's Comments to Jurors
Judges customarily make comments to prospective jurors prior to
voir dire, and then ask some questions of jurors before turning the
matter over to attorneys. Judges who relax jurors during the initial
comments and who explain the reasons for voir dire, seem to help jurors
to open themselves up during questioning. The manner in which the
judge questions the jurors also is important. Rather than asking point
blank whether any of the jurors has had a particular problem, a more
indirect method of questioning draws jurors out, especially if the judge
lets jurors know that there are private means to disclose personal infor-
mation. For example, some North Dakota judges have lunch with the
attorneys in chambers and advise jurors that they are available to discuss
problems in a private setting at that time. Jurors can simply notify the
120. See supra part IV.B. (telling the jury about the case).
121. ND. R. Civ. P. 47(a).
122. ND. R. Cinu. P. 24(a).
123. State v. Olson, 290 N.W.2d 664,666 (N.D. 1980).
124. State v. Breding, 526 N.W.2d 465.467 (ND. 1995).
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clerk if they desire such a meeting, and the other jurors and spectators
will not know the request had been made.
F. USE OF PRETRIAL CONFERENCES AND AGREEMENTS
There appears to be substantial variety in how judges supervise voir
dire in their courts. Some judges allow considerably more leeway to
attorneys than others. A pretrial conference in which the judge explains
the local rules of voir dire can save considerable embarrassment to
attorneys who have not appeared before the judge. It is sometimes
possible to reach agreement of the parties as to the number of perempto-
ry challenges, jury questionnaires, the time to be spent in jury selection,
tactics which will not be used,125 and topics which should be avoided. 126
Where agreement is not possible, a motion in limine may furnish solu-
tions to many potential problems. 127
It may also be possible to have the judge ask questions to jurors on
sensitive matters. In such an event, the jurors may be less likely to be
angry with attorneys for causing them embarrassment.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Trial courts must always have considerable discretion in determin-
ing what attorneys may ask and say during voir dire. There are simply
too many variables in the types of trials heard and the biases of potential
jurors to allow voir dire to be governed by a few specific rules.
Attorneys can substantially reduce the risk of unfavorable court
rulings during jury selection by getting to know as much as possible
about how individual judges exercise their discretion. They can further
reduce their risk by reviewing the common law limitations on voir dire,
spotting potential problems before trial, and advising the court of
potential problems. The time spent in preparation is insignificant when
compared to the time and cost of a mistrial or reversal on appeal. The
court can always exercise its discretion more wisely with time to reflect
on options available.
Preparation for voir dire also is important for the image of our
profession. The people who see us most often are the prospective jurors
who are drawn from families and work, often at considerable economic
sacrifice. The attorney who wastes their time, unduly embarrasses them
or makes unwarranted invasions of their privacy risks condemnation not
125. Windle Turley, Voir Dire: Preparation and Execution, in THE LITIGATION MANUAL: A
PRIMER FOR TRIAL LAWYERS 409,411 (John G. Koelti ed., 1989).
126. See South v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 290 N.W.2d 819, 838 (N.D. 1980) (noting
parties prohibited from discussing certain topics during the voir dire).
127. Turley, supra note 125, at 410-11.
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only for himself or herself, but for the client and the entire judicial
system as well.
The reader may note that most of the cases cited in this article are
fairly recent cases. The selection of cases was not just a result of an
attempt to keep current. The number of cases involving alleged defici-
encies in jury selection is increasing in North Dakota. This would
appear to be a good time to review our work in this crucial area, and to
borrow from some of the wisdom of the past.
